Epistemology in Locke and Berkeley Essay Example for Free

Epistemology in Locke and Berkeley EssayEven though Locke seems to posit a mind-independent creation formed on matter, on closer examination it will be found that he does so grudgingly. Berkeley, on the early(a) hand considers the thought as unnecessary, and indeed evil. With a proper examination of the two philosophies they will found to be identical in substance, and they only disagree in their moral orientation regarding the nonion of matter. Lockes path would appear to lead to secularism, while Berkeleys to livenualism. I argue, however, that Locke is non re bothy promoting materialism. On the some new(prenominal) hand, Berkeleys stance might be the road to quietism, instead of veritable tactile sensationuality. On balance, I would kick upstairs Locke.Both philosophers are Empiricists, at that placefore lay call for that all knowledge is derived from sense have intercourse alone. The very purport against whom this philosophy is directed are the Rational ists, following Descartes, who contended that the mind is possessed of innate knowledge, which is discovered through the cover of reason as applied to the sensory data of experience. Descartes numbered substance as three the soul exposed of thought, the non-thinking material world, and perfection.Excluding God as the unknow fit entity, the Cartesians grappled with mind and matter duality, confident that both could be mum as agents interacting with each other. However all efforts in this direction ended in pantheism, where God is invoked as the necessary and indispensable agent of mind and matter interaction. Lockes philosophy is primarily aimed at overcoming Cartesian duality, and the uniform can be said of Berkeleys. Locke focuses his attack on the Cartesian mind with its innate approximations. Berkeley, on the other hand, attacks the concept of mind-independent matter.Locke pictures the mind as a white piece of paper, on which experience writes all possible content, and tha t which we are able to describe as mind. Before the mind experiences the external material world it has no knowledge. This is made up of ideas, which is that formed when something impinges on our senses, coming from the object of perception.The actual process of contagion is inscrutable, though, which Locke is at pains to assign out. The ideas are generally nothing like the object itself, and so the precedent that is talked about, as the body being caue of the sense perception, is left shrouded. To make this point Locke shows that we form positive ideas from make up the lack of causation. So that the absence of light is positively a shadow to us. Just like the names we give to objects are nothing like the objects themselves, so that most of the ideas that form in the mind provide no more the likeness of something existing without us (qtd. in Bowie, 251).With this provision out of the way, Locke goes on to claim that there are certain ideas which do bear resemblance to the objec t being observed. The ideas of extension, solidity, shape and motility are indeed said to reside in the object itself. These aspects of matter are intuited, and form what Locke footing primeval election qualities. This is why the ideas of shape, solidity and motion earn such distinct and forceful presence in our mind. It is due to the fact that such ideas constitute the only information transmitted from matter itself to the mind. All other ideas, termed as secondary, are derived from the primary ones, and compounded from them in various ways. In this way color, taste, smell, texture etc are all secondary qualities.These ideas are characterized by their relative nature, so that no two observers are able to agree exactly on a quality like taste or color. At the same time they are not as distinct as are the simple ideas. The same fodder item can be sweet when tasted in health, and bitter when in fever. Again Locke takes care to point out that there is no necessary causation invol ved. The idea of blueness, along with the particular fragrance, that we get from safekeeping a violet cannot be linked to the flower itself, so that it is no more impossible to cogitate that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they induct no similitude (Ibid 253).Berkeley insists that the relativistic argument must(prenominal) also apply to the primary qualities of Locke, so that there can be no agreement pull down regarding shape, size and motion. Different perspectives of the same event gives rise to different ideas, so that a large true building might appear to be small and rectangular when seen from a distance and a skew perspective. Locke argues, however, that such leavings can be reasoned away, by the use of geometry and knowledge of the observers agency relative to the object of scrutiny. Because such correction is possible the mind can be said to have true knowledge regarding extension. Thus, the thesis of simple ideas, the crux of Lockes epistemo logy, is restored.Against this, Berkeley would complain that there cannot be any distinction between primary and secondary sensations. He asks us to try to imagine, if we can, the shape of an object without color. And because we cannot our notion of extension is inseparable from the so-called secondary sensations. That which Locke claimed as distinct as an idea, is found out not to be really so. Shape, size and motion appear to us always associated with color, tone, texture, taste, mood, and so on, and the two categories of sensations cannot be clinically separated at all. And if it is the case that the secondary qualities are not in the object itself, just now are framed by the mind that perceives it, then the same must be true for the primary qualities too (Ibid 256).Locke had dismissed Descartes materialism, and yet held on to the notion of matter by the slender thread of primary qualities. Berkeley overturns this too, so that there is nothing left with which to grasp on to a no tion of matter as a mind-independent entity. He simply applies Occams razor to the preceding argument and concludes that, if God would impart to us our idea of extension, whether there be matter or not, then it is illogical to postulate the separate human beings of matter, a thing that serves no function at all, and to do so would be tantamount to imputing that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose (Ibid 258). We know that this is an argument that Locke would have appreciated, because he himself uses Occams razor at many points in his own argument, for example, when he postulates that all experience is derived from only simple ideas.Berkeley is not saying, Nothing exists. The external world is indeed real, but as an idea in the mind of God, and maintained as such so that we are able to refer to an inviolable fixity in nature. Existence is either as a spirit or as an idea. The spirit is that which perceives idea. Apart from our own existence we also perceive ideas. These too are said to have real existence. A table does not cease to exist just because we have left the room and there is none to observe it anymore. If it continues to exist, it must only be in some other mind, says Berkeley, and consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit (Ibid 255).As epistemology, Berkeleys reasoning is irrefutable, except that it does not inspire active enquiry as does Lockes. After a proper examination of the latters philosophy it will be found not to differ in essence from that of Berkeley, except in structure and the terminology used. But such a difference is not a minor one either. The distinction of primary ideas made by Locke found reform expression in Kant, a century later, as the synthetic a priori ideas of the mind.The gist of Kant is that while practical(a) reason does not endure knowledge, it nevertheless presages the existence of pure reason, transcendent to practical reason, and the preserve of true knowledge. A further corollary to Kants philosophy is the categorical imperative, which stimulates action towards the moral path, which is the path dictated by pure reason, and also the road to true knowledge. It is easy to demonstrate that Lockes postulate of a material sense perception is the counterpart to Kants postulate of practical reason. That such an idea does not deliver knowledge both Locke and Kant admit. But contained in the idea is the imperative to enquire and attain to true knowledge. This is what Locke gist when he saysHow short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. (27)This is the spirit of activ e enquiry that we find in Locke, but not in Berkeley. Indeed, the historical influence of Locke testifies to this claim completely. The German historian Oswald Spengler was not exaggerating when he said, The Western Enlightenment is of English origin. The rationalism of the Continent comes on the whole from Locke (qtd. in Durant, 590). It is unfortunate, however, that Locke has come to be associated with materialism. Such a misunderstanding is due to a failure to compensate fully the implications of his epistemology. This is why I favor Locke over Berkeley.Works CitedBowie, G. Lee, Meredith W. Michaels and Robert C. Solomon. Twenty Questions An Introduction to Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing, 2006.Durant, Will and Ariel Durant. The board of Louis XIV A History of European Civilization in the Age of Pascal. New York Simon and Schuster,1963.Locke, John. An Essay Concerning humanistic Understanding. Bibliobazaar LLC, 2006.